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 I  Introduction 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a large increase in the number, and value, of 
leveraged going private buy-outs (LBOs) in Continental Europe and in the UK (CMBOR 
2005). This increase in LBO activity had earlier been experienced in the US in the 1980s 
(OPLER and TITMAN 1993). US evidence reveals positive and significant returns to the 
firm’s shareholders upon announcement of an LBO. For example, DE ANGELO, DE 
ANGELO and RICE (1984) find a cumulative average return (CAR) of 28.05% , LEHN and 
POULSEN (1989) of 19.90% and TRAVLOS and CORNETT (1993) of 19.89%over a 21-day 
event window ranging from 10 days before to 10 days after the announcement of and LBO 
transaction [-10;+10] repectively. Given the significant returns reported in the US, it is 
important to assess the extent to which these gains are replicated by European LBOs.   
 
In an LBO transaction a private equity investor, the former management of the company 
and an LBO fund which is managed by the private equity investor take a firm private by 
purchasing its outstanding shares. The emerging new shareholder structure aims to mitigate 
potential agency problems between management and shareholders. Subsequent to the takeover 
the shares are de-listed from the stock exchange. The flip side of the concentrated shareholder 
structure is that the financing of this transaction is only realizable with a significant amount of 
debt. In the 1980s, leverage ratios were 20 to 1 on average.1 As a result, the new highly 
leveraged company has to bear an increased financial risk. It commits itself to pay out a 
significant amount of possible future cash flows to debt holders. 
 
This study investigates the wealth effects of leveraged going private transactions by 
applying event study methodology in a pan-European context. So far, LBO research in the 
European markets is restricted to the UK. For example, WEIR, LAING and WRIGHT (2005a 
and 2005b) were the first to analyse the determinants of going private transactions in the UK. 
Their findings identify poor stock price performance, bad governance structures and low 
growth opportunities as important factors in the probability of companies going private. In 
terms of shareholder wealth effects, RENNEBOOG, SIMONS and WRIGHT (2005) 
investigate the impact of LBO announcements from 1997 to 2003 in the UK market. They 
find abnormal returns to pre-LBO shareholders of about 29.28% [-40;+40] resulting from 
better use of tax shields, bad stock price performance in the past and incentive realignment. 
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 Corporate governance has been shown to be one of the primary determinants of 
shareholder wealth gains in previous work on the US and UK. According to TIROLE (2006) 
the leveraged buyout transaction as governance instrument of the market of corporate control 
creates “a new and superior form of corporate governance”. Hence gains generated by an 
LBO may be indicative of ineffective corporate governance mechanisms. This study therefore 
analyses the impact of a number of corporate governance mechanisms on short-term 
announcement returns associated with European LBOs. These mechanisms relate to free cash 
flows, shareholder monitoring, shareholder protection, undervaluation and the market for 
corporate control.  We develop hypotheses which test the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and the extent of abnormal returns generated by an LBO announcement. 
 
An analysis focusing on the UK and Continental European LBO market is therefore 
important for the following reasons. First, unlike the homogeneous US capital market, the 
European market is heterogeneous in terms of capital market culture and development, legal 
framework and corporate governance standards. The most important difference lies in the 
composition of the shareholder structure. Most publicly traded companies in the US and the 
UK tend to be widely-held whereas the ownership structure of most Continental European 
companies exhibits a large, dominant shareholder (e.g. families or institutional shareholders) 
who exerts considerable control (FACCIO and LANG 2002). Second, the market for 
corporate control is less active and less developed in Continental Europe (FRANKS and 
MAYER 1990). Third, the protection of minority shareholders through binding corporate 
governance standards is also weak (LA PORTA et al. 1998).  
 
Furthermore, LBOs tend to involve small firms, and small companies suffer from a lack 
of attention from financial analysts and investment trusts.2 For that reason, value enhancing 
measures by the incumbent management of those firms are disregarded by the financial 
market and the actual share price may not accurately reflect the intrinsic value of the 
company. There is anecdotal evidence (e.g. Eskimuir Properties plc in 1998) that private 
equity investors purchase those companies and take them private. 
 
The above-mentioned empirical facts imply that those Continental European companies 
with an atomistic shareholder structure will suffer more agency problems than their US and 
UK counterparts because their (dispersed) shareholders can neither rely on an effective 
monitoring nor on a good corporate governance regime. Underpinning this is the argument 
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 that a less concentrated ownership structure harms firm value because of ineffective 
monitoring, (SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1986) and ADMATI, PFLEIDERER and ZECHNER 
(1994)).  
 
We find that the announcement of an LBO generates significant positive abnormal returns 
of 11.94% on the day of the announcement. We also find cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CARs) of 24.20% [-30;+30]3. Relating the abnormal returns to different explanatory 
variables in several cross-sectional regressions we find that cumulative abnormal returns are 
positively related to the extent of free float, which indicates poorer monitoring. We also find 
that CARs are higher the lesser the extent of shareholder protection as measured by an Anti-
Director-Rights Index. CARs are also higher the greater the relative decline in share price 
prior to the LBO. Lower valuations also produce higher CARs. Our results show that weak 
monitoring by shareholders and weak shareholder protection lead to significant CARs. The 
analysis therefore suggests that corporate governance mechanisms are important factors in 
explaining the short term gains generated by European LBOs. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the prior empirical 
research on LBOs and defines the variables and proxies used in the cross-sectional analysis. 
Section III focuses on the data used in the analysis and presents various descriptive statistics. 
In Section IV the test design and the results of the event study are outlined. Section V presents 
the results of our cross-sectional regression and finally, Section VI draws some conclusions. 
 
II  Possible Sources Of Abnormal Returns And Testable Hypotheses 
 
Evidence on abnormal returns can be found in different papers examining the US market. 
In an early study on shareholder returns in LBO transactions DE ANGELO, DE ANGELO 
and RICE (1984) found an abnormal cumulative return of 30.4% in a 41 day event window [-
40;0]. Depending on the length of the event window the cumulative abnormal returns of other 
previous studies on the US market are in a range of 13% to 37.9%. An overview of these 
studies is shown in Table I. 
 
[Insert Table I about here] 
 
By conducting regressions of the abnormal returns on various explanatory variables, some 
studies for the US market examined the factors and theories explaining the stock price 
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 reaction to the buyout announcements and the gains for pre-LBO shareholders. These theories 
and new explanations that account for distinctive features of the European market are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. Furthermore, we derive several hypotheses in order to 
test the explanatory power of these theories. 
 
It should be pointed out that abnormal returns are a function of the premiums4 offered by 
the bidding financial investor and the probability of success5 the market assigns to the 
respective bid. Formally, that is 
 
Stock Price at announcement date = 
(expected tender offer price) * (success probability) + (price without LBO) * (failure 
probability). 
 
The following explanations relate to both: the premiums as well as the perceived 
probability of the takeover actually being successful. 
 
II.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Mitigation Of Agency Costs Of Equity 
 
The mitigation of agency costs of equity is one of the most often cited sources for 
shareholders’ gains in LBOs. These agency costs arise when principals (shareholders) hire 
agents (external managers) to run their company and include for instance contract costs and 
the costs of monitoring between principals and agents (JENSEN and MECKLING 1976). 
 
JENSEN (1986) argues that agency problems are particularly severe for mature 
companies - like most of the companies in our sample - with few or no positive net present 
value investment opportunities and thus large free cash flows. Thus the free cash flow 
hypothesis argues that managers tend to waste these cash flows instead of distributing them to 
shareholders (JENSEN 1986, 1989). 
 
The conflict of interests between shareholders and managers over the distribution of free 
cash flows can be mitigated through an LBO. As a consequence of the substantial debt 
servicing costs incurred as a result of the LBO, the amount of free cash under management 
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 control is simply reduced and thus the potential to misuse these funds decreased. The heavy 
debt burden further disciplines managers as they are more financially responsible due to the 
risk of loan default (JENSEN 1989 and HITE and VETSUYPENS 1989). 
 
Empirical results presented by LEHN and POULSEN (1989) are consistent with Jensen’s 
agency costs of free cash flow hypothesis as their findings indicate a strong positive 
correlation between premiums and free cash flows – especially for companies with low pre-
LBO management equity holdings. Our corresponding hypothesis is: 
 
H1 (FCF): Abnormal returns are higher for companies with a high free cash flow (FCF). 
 
We employ the free cash flow definition used by LEHN and POULSEN (1989). Free cash 
flow is defined as operating income before amortization and depreciation minus taxes, interest 
expenses and dividends in the year before the buyout announcement. The free cash flows are 
then divided by the companies’ sales of the same fiscal year. Accordingly, this variable tests 
whether companies with a higher potential to misuse their cash flow show higher abnormal 
returns. The expected coefficient for FCF is thus positive. 
 
To a certain extent the problem of agency costs of equity should be mitigated by 
monitoring. In the case of public companies, however, the free rider problem prevents 
shareholders – especially those with small holdings – from sacrificing their resources to 
monitor the management (AMIHUD 1989 and JENSEN and MURPHY 1990). There are a 
number of reasons why the organizational changes associated with an LBO are expected to 
mitigate these problems. 
 
First, management becomes a significant investor in the company and will - due to the 
alignment of interests between owners and managers - refrain from value-destroying actions 
(KAPLAN 1989). Moreover, management will actively seek to increase value by increasing 
operating efficiency. 
 
Second, management is closely monitored by professionals – “active investors” (JENSEN 
1989) – who can efficiently execute this task and fully benefit from the effect. Due to the 
weak minority shareholder protection in Europe (LA PORTA et al. 1998) the problem of poor 
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 monitoring in widely-held corporations is aggravated in our sample. Depending on the quality 
of the corporate governance system, entrenched managers may be tempted to misuse excess 
liquidity for their private benefit. Under these circumstances an efficient control of 
management can only be ensured by active shareholders with a substantial equity stake.  
 
However, a possible counter-argument concerning the effect of free-riding in takeover 
situations is raised by GROSSMAN and HART (1980). They found that shareholders in an 
atomistic shareholder structure do not want to tender their shares to the bidder whenever they 
assume that the intrinsic value of the firm is higher than the offer price. This behaviour can be 
explained by the fact that small shareholders are not pivotal in the success of the takeover and 
therefore, they prefer to wait until the new acquirer has increased the value of the firm. 
Following this argument, the probability of conducting an LBO transaction (and thus the 
expected share price reaction) should be lower for companies with an atomistic shareholder 
structure. 
 
Despite this argument we expect the possible value enhancements through a more 
efficient shareholder structure and better monitoring to dominate this effect and hypothesize: 
 
H2 (monitoring): A higher free float leads to a higher abnormal return. 
 
The free float is determined by subtracting all shareholdings of investors with an interest 
of more than 5%6 of the share capital from the total share capital. These shareholdings are 
based on the last annual financial statement published prior to the LBO announcement. In 
contrast to common stock exchange free float-definitions,7 shareholdings of mutual funds are 
considered not to be free float as soon as they are in excess of 5%. It can be argued that these 
sizeable shareholdings give the fund a certain degree of influence. Even though it may be 
unlikely that fund managers with large shareholdings will actively interfere, they will surely 
have and use the opportunity to directly approach management to express their views. The 
expected coefficient for monitoring is therefore positive. 
 
Various empirical studies show that managerial ownership has a significant influence on 
firm performance (MORCK et al. 1988 and MEHRAN 1995). In addition, BEINER et al. 
(2006) find empirical evidence for the incentive-alignment hypothesis (JENSEN and 
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 MECKLING 1976) and argue that managerial stockholdings can be seen as an important 
corporate governance mechanism. Managerial ownership may also be a substitute for other 
governance mechanisms such as the extent of non-executive director representation, 
PEASNELL, POPE and YOUNG (2003).8 Therefore, we use the percentage of managerial 
ownership before the LBO announcement as an explanatory variable. If managers are large 
shareholders even before the LBO, agency-problems should be less pronounced in these 
companies. As a consequence, we expect lower efficiency gains after the LBO.  
 
H3 (stake): Higher managerial ownership before the LBO leads to smaller abnormal 
returns. 
 
However, a number of studies document a non-linear relationship between managerial 
stockholdings and firm performance, suggesting that managers might be entrenched at higher 
ownership stakes, for example, MORCK et al. (1988) and MCCONNELL and SERVAES 
(1990) for the US and WEIR, LAING and MCKNIGHT (2002) for the UK. We therefore 
control for a possible nonlinear relationship by including a squared term. 
 
H4 (stake2): The relationship between managerial equity stake and abnormal returns is 
nonlinear. 
 
Based on our data on blockholdings, we only employ managerial shareholdings in excess 
of 5% in our analysis because of data restrictions. The expected coefficient of the variable 
stake is negative while the coefficient of stake2 is expected to be positive. 
 
Corporate Governance Regime 
 
LA PORTA et al. (1998) argue that the stock price of companies is positively influenced 
by a higher degree of legal protection of minority shareholders in the relevant country. This 
means that in countries with a better legal protection of shareholders’ rights and interests, 
outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets. In general, LA PORTA et al. 
(1998) distinguish between Common and Civil Law with the former offering greater investor 
protection and the latter providing weaker investor protection. Consequently they observe a 
higher stock price valuation in countries whose legal system is based on Common Law. 
Therefore a buyout announcement should result in a higher price increase in Civil Law 
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 countries. After going private, the protection of minority shareholders is no longer required 
and the justification for the discount in bad governance regimes disappears.  
 
H5 (law): Abnormal returns are higher in Continental Europe. 
 
In our sample, the distinction between Common and Civil Law countries leads to a 
separation between UK-based companies on the one hand and Continental European firms on 
the other hand. We use a dummy variable to test for the influence of shareholder protection 
with “0” for Continental Europe, a system based on civil law, and “1” representing the UK 
where the system is based on common law. The expected coefficient for law is therefore 
negative. 
 
In order to grasp the differences between the individual corporate governance regimes in 
more detail we also employ the so-called Anti-Director-Rights-Index (ADR-Index) developed 
by LA PORTA et al. (1998). The ADR-Index rates the country’s degree of shareholder right 
protection based on different criteria and ranges from 0 (Belgium, where no criterion is 
satisfied) to 5 (for example, UK, where all criteria are satisfied), meaning that a better 
protection of shareholders’ interests is associated with a higher index value.9 It includes inter 
alia the one share one vote principle and the possibility of shareholders to vote at the 
stockholder’s meeting via Email or not. In line with the rationale concerning Civil vs. 
Common Law countries, higher stock price reactions are therefore expected in countries with 
low index values. 
 
H6 (ADR): A lower ADR-index value leads to higher abnormal returns. 
 
For both variables, country affiliation is based upon the firms’ headquarters. As stated 
above, the ADR index ranges from “0” to “5”. The expected coefficient is negative. 
 
II.2 Market Inefficiencies 
 
So far, the rationale for shareholder gains in LBO transactions is based on the assumption 
that the market is semi-strong form efficient in FAMA’s (1970, 1991) sense.10 In the presence 
of agency costs, the company might be valued correctly as the value incorporates all (public) 
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 information about these costs and managerial (mis-) behaviour. In the presence of information 
asymmetry the market value might reflect all publicly available information, but not 
management’s private information about the future prospects of the company. 
 
The possibility of conveying favourable information to market participants is often 
limited for small companies because they are usually not adequately covered by analysts and 
the financial press. The resulting illiquidity is one reason why information is inadequately 
reflected in the share price. In this case, the semi-strong form efficiency is violated. It is not 
until the publication of the LBO announcement and thus an increasing public interest that the 
stock becomes more liquid and all relevant information is incorporated in the stock price. This 
effect shall be empirically examined by the following hypothesis: 
 
H7 (size): Abnormal returns are higher for smaller firms. 
 
Size is neasured by the natural log of total assets as stated in the last annual financial 
statement prior to the buyout announcement. The expected coefficient is negative. 
 
However, even if the firm’s stock is actively traded and sufficient analysis has been 
undertaken, noise traders could ignore available information and act in a manner that brings 
about a valuation that does not reflect the stock’s intrinsic value (DE LONG, SHLEIFER, 
SUMMERS and WALDMANN 1990). 
 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned market inefficiencies alongside with other 
psychological or technical market movements might lead to an unjustified devaluation of a 
company’s stock. Dissatisfied managers who see the market value of their company slumping 
and find no way to communicate their beliefs about the ‘fair’ value to other market 
participants may seek a way out of this situation by attempting a buyout.11 For example, 
WEIR, LAING and WRIGHT (2005b) find that the management of firms going private 
perceive that the company has been undervalued by the market. On the other hand, active 
private equity investors can find appropriate buyout ‘candidates’ by looking for undervalued 
companies: 
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 H8 (price): The more the market-adjusted share price declined during the 2 years prior to 
the announcement, the higher the abnormal return. 
 
The numerator of the variable price is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two 
months prior to the LBO announcement divided by the average price, measured over 500 
trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the LBO announcement. In order 
to exclude market movements we divide this figure by the equivalent ratio of the Dow Jones 
600, a European market index covering seventeen countries. The expected coefficient for 
price is negative. 
 
It is important to notice that abnormal returns arising from the elimination of market 
inefficiencies and from the mitigation of agency problems should not be confused. In the 
empirical literature, the finding that some sort of valuation variable (e.g. P/E-ratios) is 
significantly related to the LBO announcement return is often interpreted as a sign for the 
mitigation of agency costs.12 However, it may also be a result of market inefficiency 
(violation of the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis). Although the influences of 
these interpretations cannot be strictly separated they can be united under the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H9 (P/E): The lower the companies’ P/E-ratio compared to an industry peer group, the 
higher the abnormal return. 
 
The P/E-ratios employed in this study are based on a mean of ten trading days, measured 
two months prior to the LBO announcement. By going two months backwards from the 
announcement date we want to exclude possible anticipation effects of the LBO that would 
bias the results. The P/E variable is defined as the target’s P/E-ratio divided by the peers’ 
average P/E-ratio. The expected coefficient for P/E is negative. 
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 II.3 Winner’s Curse 
 
Private equity firms might for some reason bid for a company in excess of its fair value. 
In this case, markets again are assumed to be semi-strong form efficient in the Fama sense and 
the share price is assumed to fully reflect the company’s potential. An overpayment might 
occur in competitive bidding situations, when bidders are in “deal fever” and do not want to 
accept that their analysis, negotiations and due diligence have been in vain. Overpayment 
might also be a sign of the presence of the winner’s curse effect in bidding contests. 
 
KAPLAN (1989) found higher abnormal returns for LBOs with the involvement of a 
hostile third party. LOWENSTEIN (1985) as well as AMIHUD (1989) present results which 
show substantially higher premiums in cases of competition among bidders. One reason for 
this finding might be overpayment. The fact that LBO companies occasionally fail should be 
an indicator that private equity investors (and the management of the company) misjudge a 
company’s future potential. We examine this argument by the following hypothesis: 
 
H10 (contested): Abnormal returns are higher in buyouts with multiple bids. 
 
The variable contested is a dummy that equals “1” if the successful LBO bid is a reaction 
to a previous buyout offer and “0” otherwise. The expected coefficient is positive. 
 
III  Data Sources And Descriptive Statistics 
 
The initial sample consists of a total of 225 successfully completed going private 
transactions of European companies from 1997 to 2005. The transactions are identified by 
searching the Bloomberg, Reuters and Wall Street Journal Europe databases. To be included 
in the final sample, transactions have to meet the following criteria: 
 
(1) The company subject to an LBO had to be based in the European Union.13 
 
(2) To qualify as “leveraged” transactions, the share of debt financing in the total 
transaction had to be at least 50%.14 
 
(3) 100% of the target company’s share capital is bought via tender offer. 
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(4) The buyout had to be led by a private equity investor as opposed to wealthy 
individuals or strategic investors. 
 
Out of the initial 225 transactions 118 transactions which meet the above requirements are 
identified. Two of these transactions are excluded as the target company experienced financial 
distress immediately prior to the LBO and one company is excluded due to a lack of reliable 
share price data, leaving a final sample of 115 LBOs. The announcement dates of these 115 
LBOs are the days when the acquiring private equity firm released their offer price to pre-
LBO shareholders. All quotes are closing prices of the main stock exchange of the country the 
respective company is based in. Share price and balance sheet data used in this study are taken 
from Datastream and Bloomberg databases. 
 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
Panel A shows that the number of European LBOs increased significantly in the late 
1990s and fell in the early 2000s. However, as the comparison of average and median 
transaction values in Panel A Table II shows, the deal size increases from year to year in the 
sample period. This development reflects the fact that Private equity funds attract more and 
more funds in order to finance major deals like Jefferson Smurfit (deal value: 3.7 Billion €). 
The final column in Panel A shows that the value of LBO deals peaked in the years 1999 and 
2000 but then fell back. In recent years, the value of deals has started to increase again. Panel 
B shows the relative importance of the UK in LBO transactions. In the first two years of the 
sample period, LBOs only took place in the UK, but from 1999 to 2005 the share of UK 
LBOs declined to 54%. These numbers show the increasing importance of LBOs in 
Continental Europe. 
 
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
Table III presents various key statistics for the investigated companies and allows to identify 
certain particular features of LBO targets. LBOs experience relative price declines over the 
previous 500 trading days with the average Price value being 0.91. They also have, on 
average, lower P/E ratios that their peers, 0.90, and may therefore be regarded as undervalued 
and higher agency costs. The average free float is 50% and the free cash flow ratio is 0.07. In 
terms of shareholder legal protection, 52% are covered by a common law system. The average 
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 investor protection index score, ADR, is 3.92. We find that 7% of LBOs were the reaction to a 
previous buy-out offer. The average management stake is 8.6%. 
 
       As the cross-sectional analysis requires some variables to be industry-adjusted, peer 
groups of five publicly listed competitors for each of the 115 companies are identified. The 
selection of the peer groups is based on the automatic Bloomberg peer group selection. Out of 
this selection, those five companies that are most comparable to the LBO company with 
respect to their operations and regional focus and in terms of size are included in the peer 
group.15 
 
IV  Event Study 
 
IV.1 Empirical Design 
 
The abnormal returns for pre-LBO shareholders are determined in an event study.16 In our 
case the event is the LBO announcement, i.e. the proposed cash offer to shareholders 
published on newswires like Bloomberg. The abnormal returns ( ) of each company are 
computed as the difference between the observed return Rit and the expected return E(Rit/Xt), 
where Xt is the conditioning information in the modelling of the expected return. 
*
it
 
it it tR E R X     *it , (1) 
 
We use the constant mean return and the market model to calculate the daily abnormal 
returns. Both models are commonly used in event studies and should, according to BROWN 
and WARNER (1985), lead to similar results under certain conditions. 
 
Formally, the constant mean return model is given by: 
 
Rit = μi+ ξit (2) 
 E[ξit] = 0 Var[ξit] = , 2i
 
where µi is the average return for security i, Rit is the return at time t and ξit is the disturbance 
term of the equation. 
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The market model is given by: 
 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt +  (3) it
 E[ ] = 0 Var[ ] = , it it 2i
 
where Rit and Rmt are the returns of share i and an index representing the market portfolio 
m at time t, respectively. The coefficients  and  are estimated by OLS with the 
estimation period being t = -280 to t = -30 relative to the announcement day. The event period 
ranges from t = -30 to t = +30 relative to the announcement day. In estimating the market 
model, we use the broad European Dow Jones STOXX 600 index to proxy for the market 
portfolio. The Dow Jones STOXX 600 index represents large, mid and small capitalisation 
companies across 17 countries of the European region.17 
 
The more sophisticated market model removes the co-movement of the returns with the 
market. Therefore it reduces the variance of the abnormal returns which will lead to more 
precise results. 
 
The average abnormal return on day t relative to the announcement date across a sample of N 
events can be be written as: 
 
2
1
T
* *
t i
t T
1 .
N 
   t  (4) 
 
The cumulated average abnormal return (CAR) over the interval [a,b] is then given by: 
 
b
*
[a,b] t
t a
CAR .

   (5) 
 
 
After the calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns, we test their statistical 
significance using both a t-test and the non-parametric Corrado18 test. 
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IV.2 Results of the Event Study 
 
Table IV presents the event study results. The table reports daily abnormal returns for 
each day t of the event window and cumulative abnormal returns for event windows 
beginning on day -15 and ending on day t=15. t = 0 represents the day on which the LBO 
proposal was published. 
 
[Insert table IV about here] 
 
As can be seen from Table IV, the announcements of LBOs cause significant positive 
abnormal returns for shareholders. On the days before and after the announcement (t = -1 and 
t = +1), average abnormal returns amount to about 0.8%. These returns are significant at the 
.01 (t-test) and .05 level (Corrado-Test). On the announcement day (t = 0), an average 
abnormal return of 11.94% is earned, also highly significant (t-value = 55.42). Dependent on 
the time of the day when the buyout information reaches the capital market, the day of the 
release as well as the following day can be the actual announcement day. Since this is not 
known for most buyouts, the period from t = 0 to t = +1 - and therefore the two-day CAR of 
12.75% (t-value 41.84) - should be considered the announcement period return. From the ratio 
of positive to negative abnormal returns on day 0, it is obvious that the announcement returns 
are not due to individual outliers. 
 
In addition to the high abnormal returns on the announcement day, table IV shows 
significant returns prior to this date in some cases. For example, ARs for the days t = -4, 
t = -9, t = -12 and t = -15 amount to 0.47%, 1.33%, 0.46% and 0.46%, respectively (all 
significant at the 0.05 level). These abnormal returns prior to the actual announcement day 
can be explained by a possible leakage of information.19 There may, for example, be rumours 
about an upcoming LBO that already affect prices. With respect to the extraordinary high ARs 
in the announcement period (t = 0 ; t = +1) and the number of positive and negative returns, 
however, it can be concluded that information for most buyout offers becomes available to 
market participants only on the announcement day. In the period following the announcement, 
no significant abnormal returns can be observed. This suggests that all expected gains from 
the LBO are fully captured by the capital market only a few days after the announcement of 
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 the first bid. Therefore, this finding also provides evidence for the semi-strong market 
efficiency in European capital markets as defined by FAMA (1970 and 1991). 
 
Furthermore, as can be seen in table V, the cumulative abnormal returns over different 
event windows show significant abnormal returns. 
 
[Insert table V about here] 
 
Regarding the alternative methods of calculating the abnormal returns no differences 
between the constant mean return model and the market model could be detected. As shown 
in table V and figure I, the average cumulative abnormal returns are very close to each other 
and do also have comparable levels of significance. For example, the returns over the period 
[-1;+1] are 13.60% for the market model and 13.61% for the constant mean model and over 
the period [-5;+5], the returns are 15.77% and 15.89% respectively. 
 
[Insert figure I about here] 
 
Another robustness check was carried out in order to investigate the abnormal returns in 
our sample. The abnormal returns were computed by subtracting the average return of the 
industry peer group20 on each event day from the realized return of the LBO target. This “peer 
group event study” is justified by the fact that a company’s returns are closely correlated with 
the returns of its industry competitors. LANG and STULTZ (1992) were the first who 
compared a company’s abnormal returns with the abnormal returns of its industry peer group 
on the announcement day.21 The results from this alternative approach confirm our previous 
findings.22 
 
In conclusion, this study for the European capital market shows high and significant 
abnormal returns for pre-LBO shareholders of the LBO targets. The magnitude of the CARs 
lies in the range of values obtained in previous studies for the US market. 
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 V  Results Of The Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Using the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) we analyse the influence of the 
different determinants presented in Section II by means of the following general empirical 
model: 
 
CAR(-1,+1)i = c0 + c1 FCFi + c2 monitoringi + c3 stakei + c4 stake2i + c5 lawi + c6 ADRi +  
+ c7 sizei + c8 pricei + c9 P/Ei + c10 contestedi + yeardummies +  (6) 
countrydummies + ei ,  
 
where CAR(-1, +1)i is the 3-day23 cumulated abnormal return for company i and ei  is the 
error term. T-statistics are based upon White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.24 
There is no sign of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables.25 
 
As a robustness check we employ three variations of the original design. Model II shows 
the regression of the CARs of another event window [0;+5] on the possible explanatory 
variables. Models III and IV are both restricted models of models I and II in which 
insignificant variables of the first two models and the year and time dummies are excluded. 
The results can be seen in table VI: 
[Insert table VI about here] 
 
The results support our hypothesis that corporate governance issues help to explain 
shareholder wealth gains in European LBO transactions. First, as hypothesized, the corporate 
governance regime has a negative and significant (at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.10-level) influence 
on the abnormal stock returns initiated by the announcement of an LBO transaction. The 
significant ADR variable implies that a poor protection of minority shareholders’ rights can 
serve as an explanation for the wealth created for pre-LBO shareholders. 
 
Second, the agency cost theory – mitigation of agency cost through closer monitoring – is 
further supported by the fact that, as hypothesized, the coefficient of the variable monitoring 
is significant (at the 0.05- or 0.10-level) and positive in all regressions. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that as a result of an atomistic shareholder structure, management is not 
sufficiently controlled by its shareholders. Therefore, the stock price reaction is higher for 
companies with scattered shareholdings and thus a greater potential for efficiency 
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 improvements due to a more sophisticated and closer monitoring by the private equity 
investor. 
 
Third, as predicted, the variable P/E has a statistically significant (at the 0.05- or 0.10-
level) and negative coefficient in all regressions. This finding implies that a company with 
profound agency-conflicts is undervalued compared to its peers that do not suffer from these 
problems. However, the undervaluation reflected by the P/E-ratio could also be related to an 
inadequate market valuation or information asymmetries assuming that peers are correctly 
valued and show no information asymmetries. These interpretations are further supported by 
the results for the variable price, which is significant (at the 0.05-level or better) and negative 
in all equations. 
 
Fourth, the regression results show insignificant coefficients for the variables FCF, stake, 
stake2, law, contested and size. The insignificant law variable indicates that there is no 
significant difference between the abnormal returns in Continental Europe and the UK. 
Furthermore, the firm’s FCFs prior to the going private transaction fail to explain the high 
abnormal returns observed in leveraged buyouts. Finally, the coefficients of all explanatory 
variables remain nearly unchanged when including time and country dummies. 
 
The Wald-Coefficient test is used to investigate whether the insignificant coefficients in 
models one and two are also jointly insignificant. The high p-values of 0.812 and 0.818 
indicate that the null hypothesis that all insignificant coefficients are equal to zero cannot be 
rejected in both models. We therefore estimate two restricted models (models 3 and 4) where 
only the significant variables of model one and two are included. The results confirm our 
previous findings. 
 
One potential problem is that the period over which the price variable is calculated 
overlaps with the estimation window of the event study. This overlap could bias the results. 
Therefore, we estimated an additional regression using the CARs from the “peer group event 
study” as dependent variable. In this alternative approach, the abnormal returns are obtained 
by subtracting the peer group returns from the event window returns. Thus, no estimation 
window is needed. The results from these specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to the findings presented above.26 
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 VI Conclusions 
 
The increasing number of LBOs in Europe has recently initiated several empirical 
examinations of the wealth gains associated with the buyout announcements (e.g. WEIR, 
LAING and WRIGHT 2005a or RENNEBOOG, SIMONS and WRIGHT 2005). These 
studies confirm previous evidence for the US, finding high premiums and significant 
abnormal returns in UK LBOs.  
 
In order to gain deeper insights into the wealth effects of LBOs we therefore investigate a 
sample of 115 European leveraged going private transactions. Thus, we are able to examine 
whether institutional differences across countries have an influence on shareholder gains. Our 
results indicate that the pre-LBO quality of corporate governance mechanisms explain the 
magnitude of abnormal returns. On a macro level, we find that shareholder gains are larger in 
countries that have comparatively weaker protection for minority shareholders’ rights and 
interests. On a firm level, companies with a high free float and dispersed shareholdings show 
(on average) higher announcement returns, meaning that the organizational changes inherent 
with the leveraged buyout (better monitoring and incentive alignment) create value in these 
companies. Other firm level findings confirm previous evidence on the UK and the US. 
Companies that are undervalued compared to a peer group of market-listed firms exhibit 
higher abnormal returns. In addition, announcement returns are higher for firms with a poor 
stock market performance prior to the buyout.  
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1 See TIROLE (2006). 
2 See HANDELSBLATT Nr. 149, page 29, 4th of August 2000. 
3 The event window contains 61 days (30 days before and 30 days after the event day 0). 
4 The premium is defined as the differential between the offer price and the current stock price 
(before the announcement). 
5 This success probability depends for example on the willingness of the shareholders to 
accept the tender offer. 
6 Although shareholdings below 5% have to be declared in the UK, we applied the 5% 
threshold to all countries in order to get consistent results (e.g. the German regulation defines 
the threshold as 5% and therefore it is not possible to get information on shareholdings below 
5%). 
7 E.g. the definition of the Deutsche Börse AG. 
8 However, the evidence is mixed with LODERER and MARTIN (1997) and AGRAWAL and KNOEBER 
(1996) finding no relationship between managerial ownership and performance. 
9 A detailed summary of the ADR-Index is presented in LA PORTA et al. (1998), pp.1130-
1131.. 
10 In this context, the “efficient market” is defined as a market where all historical and 
publicly available information about future prospects is incorporated in the share price. 
11 See Ross Johnson (former CEO of RJR Nabisco, which has undergone the largest LBO in 
history) after a one-year decline of the stock price: “It’s plain as the nose on your face that 
this company is wildly undervalued… Diversification is not working. We are sitting on food 
assets that are worth twenty-two, twenty-five times earnings and we trade at nine times 
earnings, because we’re still seen as a tobacco company…The only way to recognize these 
values, I believe, is through a leveraged buyout.” BURROUGH and HELYAR (1990). 
12 TRAVLOS and CORNETT (1993) for instance find that in a cross-sectional regression 
against abnormal shareholder returns, the relative P/E ratio is highly significant and conclude: 
“This finding is consistent with the joint hypothesis that the more severe the agency problems 
within the going private firms, the lower the relative P/E ratio, and that the lower this ratio, 
the larger the room for improvement.” 
13 Based on the composition of the EU in Dec. 2002. 
14 HALPERN, KIESCHNICK and ROTENBERG (1999) also use this criterion in order to 
identify pure LBO transactions. Here, debt financing includes all cash interest bearing debt or 
debt-like tranches, such as Senior Debt, Mezzanine Notes and Bridge Loans. They do not 
include debt-like tranches sponsored by the private equity investor, such as shareholder loans 
or Payment in Kind (PIK) notes. 
15 The balance sheet data of the three full financial years prior to the announcement date of the 
buyout is used. In some cases, the relevant currency within the peer Group differs. Therefore, 
we correct these differences by converting the different rates into one currency using the 
official exchange rate. 
16 The event study closely follows the research design of BROWN and WARNER (1985). 
17 For a detailed description of the Dow Jones STOXX 600 index see www.stoxx.com. 
18 See CORRADO (1989) for details. 
19 We cross-checked whether other firm relevant events (e.g. earnings announcement) 
occurred during the event window. No such events could be detected for the companies 
causing these significant abnormal returns before the announcement. 
20 Due to a lack of available data the peer group’s size was reduced for some companies. 
21 LANG and STULTZ (1992) investigated the abnormal returns in the context of bankruptcy 
announcements. 
                                                                                                                                                         
22 Average cumulative returns based on the “peer group event study” (event window size in 
parentheses): 11.21% [0], 12.69% [-1;+1], 14.92% [-5;+5], 17.37% [-15;+15], 22.78% [-
30;+30]. 
23 The regression results are robust to variations of the event window size. Results for the 
CAR(0, +5)i  are also presented in the following. 
24 Tests for heteroscedasticity are conducted using the White Heteroscedasticity Test (without 
cross-terms). The test statistics of  models one and two (57.34 and 46.22) lie above the 0.05-
critical Chi-Square values.  
25 The absence of multicollinearity can be supported by the finding that there are no high pair-
wise correlations among the independent variables. The highest correlation coefficient (-
0.4752) is observed between the variables price and ADR. 
26 The coefficients of ADR, P/E, price and monitoring are significant at the 0.05-level.  
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 Table I 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in various empirical studies 
 
Author (Publishing Year and 
Number of LBOs) 
Days before and after the first 
announcement[0] 
Average cumulative abnormal 
return 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Rice  [-1 ; +1] 22.27% 
(1984) (72)  [-40 ; 0] 30.40% 
Grammatikos, Swary  [-1 ; 0] 14.04% 
(1986) (131)  [-10 ; 0] 19.52% 
Lehn, Poulsen  [-1 ; +1] 16.30% 
(1989) (263)  [-10 ; +10] 19.90% 
Kaplan  [-60 ; 0] 37.90% 
(1989) (25)   
Amihud  [-20 ; 0] 19.60% 
(1989) (15)   
Marais, Schipper, Smith  [-1 ; 0] 13.00% 
(1989) (80)   
Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan,   [-1 ; 0] 17.84% 
Davidson (1992) (50)   
Travlos, Cornett   [-1 ; 0] 16.20% 
(1993) (56)  [-10 ; +10] 19.89% 
Van der Gucht, Moore  [-1 ; +1] 15.60% 
(1998) (187)  [-10 ; +10] 20.20% 
Renneboog, Simons, Wright   [-1 ; 0] 22.68% 
(2005) (177)  [-40 ; +40] 29.28% 
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 Table II 
 
Number, average transaction value, median transaction value, sum of transaction values and of 
the sample LBOs by year (Panel A) and by country (Panel B) 
Transaction Values are taken from the Bloomberg database 
Panel A 
Year 
 
 
Number of LBOs 
 
 
Average of 
transaction values
(in Mio. €) 
Median transaction 
value 
(in Mio. €) 
Sum of transaction 
values 
(in Mio. €) 
1997 3  116.2  151.3  348.5 
1998 13  408.6  122.1  5312 
1999 30  390.8  180.7  11,722.8 
2000 23  444.2  474.6  10,217.5 
2001 9  742.7  314.0  6,684.5 
2002 12  621.7  266.7  7,459.8 
2003 9  610.0  439.8  5,490.2 
2004 9  668.3  641.3  6,014.9 
2005 7  999.4  843.1  6,995.7 
     
1997-2005 115 523.9 251.5 60,245.8 
Panel B 
Country 
 
 
Number of 
LBOs 
 
Average of 
transaction values
(in Mio. €) 
Median transaction 
value 
(in Mio. €) 
Sum of transaction 
values 
(in Mio. €) 
United Kingdom 60  430.8  223.0  29,724.5 
Germany 12  538.8  386.3  6,466.1 
France 11  232.9  175.3  2,562.3 
Netherlands 5  786.2  641.3  3,931.1 
Sweden 5  445.6  355.4  2,227.9 
Denmark 3  1,363.0  215.9  4,089.1 
Finland 3  436.7  88.2  1,310.1 
Ireland 3  2,417.9  3,013.7  7,253.7 
Norway 2  628.3  628.3  1,256.5 
Italy 1  647.3  647.3  647.3 
Spain 1  777.2  777.2  777.2 
     
Sum 115  523.9  251.5  60,245.8 
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 Table III 
 
Key Data of the sample LBOs 
The free cash flow definition is the same as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989). The free cash flows are then 
divided by the companies’ sales of the same fiscal year. The free float (monitoring) is being 
determined by subtracting all shareholdings of investors with an interest of more than 5% of the share 
capital from the total share capital. The relative P/E-ratio is computed by dividing the company’s P/E-
ratio by the P/E-ratio of the industry peer-group. The company’s share price performance (price) is 
defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior to the LBO announcement divided by 
the average price, measured over 500 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the 
LBO announcement. In order to exclude market movements we divide this figure by the equivalent 
ratio of the Dow Jones 600 market index. We use a dummy variable (law) to test for the influence of 
shareholder protection with “0” for Continental Europe, a system based on civil law, and “1” 
representing the UK where the system is based on common law. The variable ADR is based on the 
Anti-Director-Rights-Index (ADR-Index) developed by La Porta et al. (1998). The variable contested 
is a dummy that equals “1” if the successful LBO bid is a reaction to a previous buyout offer and “0” 
otherwise. Size is measured by the natural log of total assets. Managerial ownership (if larger than 5%) 
is measured by the variable stake. 
 Average Stand. Deviation. Median Spectrum 
FCF 0.070 0.142 0.063  [-0.926 ; 0.504] 
monitoring 0.503 0.218 0.512  [0 ; 0.939] 
P/E 0.897 0.672 0.681  [0.109 ; 4.307] 
price 0.909 0.323 0.870  [0.190 ; 1.807] 
law 0.522 0.502 1  [0 ; 1] 
ADR 3.922 1.470 5  [ 0 ; 5] 
contested 0.070 0.256 0  [ 0 ; 1] 
size 12.259 1.518 12.290  [ 8.698 ; 16.037]
stake 0.086 0.158 0  [ 0 ; 1] 
stake2  0.032 0.115 0  [ 0 ; 1] 
 
  7
 Table IV 
 
Daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for the whole sample 
of 115 European LBOs based on the Market Model. 
Column 1 lists a cut-out of the event window relative to the announcement day (t = 0), column 2 
contains the daily average abnormal returns (ARs) for each event day. Columns 3 and 4 present the 
corresponding test statistics (t-Test and Corrado-Test). These statistics indicate whether the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal return on a given day can be rejected or not. Cumulative daily average 
abnormal returns (CARs) are displayed in column 5, while column 6 shows the ratio of positive and 
negative abnormal returns. 
Day 
relative to the 
announcement 
 
Daily average 
abnormal return 
(AR) in % 
 
t-value 
 
 
 
Corrado- test 
statistic 
 
 
Cumulative daily 
average abnormal 
return 
(CAR) in % 
Positive: 
Negative 
 
 
 -15  0.46%  2.14 *  0.19  0.46% 51:64 
 -14  0.18%  0.82  - 0.05  0.64% 52:63 
 -13  0.01%  0.03  0.44  0.64% 53:52 
 -12  0.46%  2.13 *  0.85  1.10% 59:56 
 -11  0.34%  1.60  0.57  1.45% 57:58 
 -10  0.21%  0.99  1.33  1.66% 62:53 
 -9  1.33%  6.15**  1.26  2.99% 62:53 
 -8  0.34%  1.58  1.44  3.33% 64:51 
 -7  0.03%  0.14  - 0.44  3.36% 48:67 
 -6  - 0.09%  - 0.44  - 0.93  3.27% 43:72 
 -5  0.30%  1.39  0.20  3.57% 54:61 
 -4  0.47%  2.20 *  1.03  4.04% 61:54 
 -3  0.19%  0.89  1.97  4.23% 66:49 
 -2  0.28%  1.28  0.66  4.51% 59:56 
 -1  0.84%  3.92**  2.10 *  5.35% 66:49 
 0  11.94%  55.42**  10.72**  17.30% 102:13 
 1  0.81%  3.75**  2.13 *  18.10% 59:56 
 2  0.43%  1.97  1.73  18.53% 63:52 
 3  0.04%  0.17  0.78  18.57% 59:56 
 4  0.32%  1.47  - 0.12  18.88% 51:64 
 5  0.15%  0.70  1.38  19.03% 52:63 
 6  - 0.03%  - 0.15  0.22  19.00% 52:63 
 7  0.02%  0.09  0.38  19.02% 55:60 
 8  0.03%  0.14  0.16  19.05% 51:64 
 9  - 0.08%  - 0.35  0.43  18.97% 56:59 
 10  0.00%  0.01  0.40  18.98% 53:62 
 11  - 0.07%  - 0.32  - 0.04  18.91% 49:66 
 12  0.08%  0.37  0.25  18.98% 52:63 
 13  0.02%  0.11  0.24  19.01% 51:64 
 14  0.06%  0.29  0.74  19.07% 57:58 
 15  0.00%  0.01  - 0.05  19.07% 47:68 
*significant at the 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test) 
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 Table V 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model and the constant mean return 
model using daily stock data 
The following table displays CARs for different symmetric event windows around the event day 
(t=0) based on the market model and the constant mean return model. 
Event Window 
 
 
Market Model 
CARs (t-value) 
 
Constant Mean Return Model 
CARs (t-value) 
 
[-1;+1] 13.60% (36.43) 13.61% (35.60) 
[-5;+5] 15.77% (22.06) 15.89% (21.70) 
[-15;+15] 19.07% (15.90) 19.32% (15.72) 
[-30;+30] 24.20% (14.38) 24.33% (14.12) 
 
 
Figure I 
Average cumulative abnormal returns based on the Market Model and the Constant Mean Return 
Model 
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Table VI 
 
Estimated Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the CAR regression 
OLS-regression of the CARs [-1;+1] and CARs [0;+5] on the variables FCF, monitoring, P/E, price, law, 
ADR, contested and size for 115 European LBOs between 1997-2005. T-statistics are based upon the 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
explanatory  
variable 
expected 
sign 
model 1 
CARs [-1;+1] 
model 2 
CARs [0;+5] 
model 3 
CARs [-1;+1] 
model 4 
CARs [0;+5] 
Const.   0.171 (1.15)  0.559 (3.91)***  0.238 (3.86)**  0.228 (4.92)** 
FCF +  -0.051 (-0.60)  -0.028 (-0.26)   
monitoring +  0.121 (1.86)*  0.132 (1.89)*  0.149 (2.32)**  0.087 (1.98)** 
P/E -  -0.028 (-1.70)*  -0.029 (-2.10)**  -0.028 (-2.23)**  -0.029 (-2.31)** 
price -  -0.134 (-2.50)**  -0.144 (-2.58)**  -0.106 (-2.83)**  -0.127 (-3.56)***
law -  0.005 (0.14)  0.002 (0.62)   
ADR -  -0.027 (-2.30)**  -0.040 (-4.19)***  -0.014 (-1.70)*  -0.014 (-2.02)** 
contested +  -0.051(-1.00)  -0.020 (-0.37)   
size -    0.011 (1.26)  -0.013 (-1.43)   
stake -  -0.014 (-0.09)  0.088 (0.56)   
stake2 +  0.022 (0.10)  -0.145 (-0.75)   
      
Year dummies  yes yes no no 
Country dummies  yes yes no no 
      
N  115 115 115 115 
R2   0.36 0.37 0.18 0.19 
F-statistic (p-Value)  1.69 (0.03) 2.93 (0.02) 6.04 (0.00) 6.46 (0.00) 
*significant at the 0.10 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
